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NOTES AND COMMENT
Automobiles: Agency: Husband and Wife.
The defendant permitted his wife to take his car and drive to
Madison from Monroe for the purpose of getting her mother and bring-
ing her to the Zastrow home in Monroe. He had bought the car before
their marriage. On the way back to Madison there was a collision be-
tween the car of the defendant and that of the plaintiff. The jury
found facts upon which the plaintiff was entitled to recover, if Mrs.
Zastrow was the agent of the defendant husband, in driving the car.
The question of agency was for the court to decide, and the trial court
found for the plaintiff, saying that Mrs. Zastrow was an agent. De-
fendant appealed. Held: Mrs. Zastrow was not the agent of the de-
fendant in driving the car, for which reason the judgment must be
reversed, cause remanded, with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
Novak v. Zastrow, (Wis.) 28 N.W. 473.
The question of whether Mrs. Zastrow was the agent of her hus-
band, the defendant, was left for the court to decide. The trial court
first decided that Mrs. Zastrow was not the agent of her husband, but
after its attention was called by counsel to Enea v. Pfister, 180 Wis.,
329, it made a finding that, "at the time of the collision Mrs. Zastrow
was driving the car, owned by the defendant, as his agent and in the
scope of his business and within the scope of her authority," and then
entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Enea v. Pfister was a case,
though, that called for the doing of justice. There a five year old girl
was run down through negligence on the part of a truck driver. The
plaintiff then sought to hold the owner of the truck liable for the in-
juries inflicted while the truck was driven by another, and it was held
that proof of the ownership of the car makes out a prima facie case,
on the theory that this fact justifies an inference or raises a presump-
tion that he who -was driving the car was the agent or servant .of the
owner and that he was driving it in the pursuit of the owner's business
and within the scope of his employment; and the evidence in this case
was not sufficient to overcome the probative force of the inference. But
this rule loses its probative force where the evidence is undisputed
concerning the purposes for which the car was being used at the time
of the accident.
The ordinary rules as to actual, apparent, or ostensible agency must
be applied. 13 R.C.L. 1178. The mother was desirous of the visit, yet
no legal duty of seeing to her transportation could be implied in any
way. There was no duty on the defendant's part to see to this, so it
cannot be said that upon the trip the wife was prosecuting the hus-
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
band's business. There was absolutely no evidence of any request or
direction given to or by the defendant. It was a mere courtesy extended
by the defendant and 'his wife to the wife's mother. In driving the
car the defendant's wife was simply performing a service for her
mother. The wife did some shopping in Madison, and granting that
she had authority, if needed, to pledge her husband's credit, yet that
does not mean that in doing her own shopping she was acting as de-
fendant's agent.
Justice Crownhart in dissenting said, "The wife, authorized by her
husband, took his car to transport his mother-in-law to his home, to
be the family guest. I contend that this was the husband's business
and so recognized by him." Such is perhaps a disappearing view in the
face of all of the new laws of the last decade or so that deal with the
freedom and emancipation of womankind. He further says, "The mar-
riage relation has not yet degenerated into a mere business compact."
Quite true, so then why should the honorable Justice try to make out
that the wife was about her husband's business? Is getting and driving
her own mother her husband's 'business'? If so, then we may say that
the terms "wife" and "agent" are synonymous and interchangeable.
The general and rather uniform rule in the United States is that the
relationship of son, daughter, or wife to the owner of the car does not
make for agency when they drive the car. That is, unless the evidence
directly shows that unless the driver is about the business of the car
owner, no liability exists, through agency, because of accidents of the
driver. (195.2 Automobiles, Third Decennial Digest.) It seems that
something more than permission or a request to use the car is needed
before making the owner liable for the acts of the driver. Mast v.
Hirsch, 199 Mo., App. 1, is directly in point. It held that a husband's
mere permission that his wife may use his automobile for pleasure for
herself and relatives, without his direction or request that she so use it,
does not make her his agent so as to render him liable for her negli-
gence resulting in injury to a third person. Also if the wife takes the
automobile out on her own business or pleasure, the husband, though
consenting, is not liable for the driver's negligence. There are very
few cases that seem to hold the other way; 52 Montana 300; 181 North
Carolina 214; 41 North Dakota 260. These few cases, however, rely
upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, but even in these few cases
it seems that the evidence tends to show some agency coupled with a
need of doing justice, especially where the driver is almost judgment
proof.
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